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THE CONSTITUTION AND OCCUPATIONAL
LICENSING IN MASSACHUSETTS
HENRY PAUL MONAGHAN*

Judges have long recognized that the right to earn a living in any
of the common occupations is among those fundamental interests which
a democratic society should protect. Justice Bradley characterized it as
an "inalienable right,"' and Justice Douglas asserted that it is "the
most precious liberty that man possesses." '2 Indeed, Mr. Justice Field
viewed protection of this right as one of the distinguishing features
of our republican institutions.3 That the right to earn a living is
generally within the protective mantle of the Fourteenth Amendment
is now long settled constitutional doctrine. Writing for a unanimous
court in 1915, Mr. Justice Hughes declared: "It requires no argument
to show that the right to work for a living in the common occupations
of the community is of the very essence of the personal freedom and
opportunity that it was the purpose of the Amendment to secure. ' 4
The Massachusetts court has been especially vigorous in asserting the
constitutional standing accorded this right. Speaking in terms reminiscent of the eighteenth century natural lawyers, it said in 1924: "Manifestly no statute by attempting to outlaw a natural right can deprive
one of the opportunity to earn his livelihood. The right to labor and
to do ordinary business are natural, essential, and inalienable, partaking of the nature both of personal liberty and private property." 5
Important as is the right to earn a livelihood, recent developments
along a number of fronts have resulted in a marked curtailment of
individual freedom of entry into various occupations. The developments
* A.B. Univ. of Mass., LL.B. Yale, LL.M. Harvard; presently associated with
the Boston law firm of Foley, Hoag, Eliot.
1 Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746, 762 (1884) (concurring opinion).
2 Barsky v. Board of Regents of New York, 347 U.S. 442, 472 (1954) (dissenting opinion).
3 Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 121 (1888).
4 Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41. Accord: Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of New Mexico, 353 U.S. 232, 238-239 (1957) ; Green v. McElroy, 360 U.S.
474, 492 (1959).
5 Opinion of the Justices, 247 Mass. 589, 597, 143 N.E. 808 (1924). "The jurists
who believe in natural law seem to me to be in that naive state of mind that
accepts what has been familiar and accepted by them and their neighbors as
something that must be accepted by all men everywhere." Holmes, J., Natural
Law, 32 Harv. L. Rev. 40, 41 (1918).
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have been multifarious. Labor unions now exert considerable control
over occupational entry.6 There has been an increasing tendency on
the part of legislatures to condition an individual's choice of gainful
activities upon the consent of other private persons-the most common
example being the "consent" zoning ordinance. 7 Here I propose to
focus upon still another significant control over free occupational entry:
the requirement of a state license as a prerequisite to occupational practice. This license issues only to those who demonstrate a certain minimum proficiency, and, of course, the imposition of a licensing system
upon an occupational activity automatically involves the rejection of
any unlimited occupational entry notions. The Massachusetts statutes
and decisions will be used as a convenient illustration of the considerations involved in this process.
I

Preliminary to any examination of the questions posed in the licensing of persons seeking to enter various occupations, is an understanding of the basic constitutional framework within which the legislature
must operate when enacting laws restricting economic activities. The
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution acts as a general limitation
on the power of the state legislatures. But, except perhaps in the civil
rights area, that Amendment requires only that the legislative reconciliation of the conflicting interests involved not be arbitrary or unreasonable.8 Ordinarily, questions of policy are for the legislature, and
a court will intervene only if the legislative determination can be said
to lack any reasonable policy basis, given the interests at stake. A
recent decision of the Supreme Court applied this standard to a municipal ordinance restricting the right to work. Breard v. City of Alexandria9 involved an ordinance prohibiting peddlers or canvassers from
calling on occupants of private residences without having been requested to do so. A magazine salesman was convicted under the
ordinance and his appeal was based on constitutional grounds. The
majority opinion laconically rejected the argument that this ordinance
6 Weyland, Majority Rule in Collective Bargaining, 45 Col. L. Rev. 556
(1945) ; Cox, Labor Law, Cases and Materials, 990-1019 (Foundation
Press, 1958) ; Jaffe, Law Making By Private Groups, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 201,
234-235 (1937).
7 Compare, Sullivan v. Police Commissioner of Boston, 304 Mass. 113, 23
N.E.2d 106 (1939) and Note 6, U.C.L.A. Law Rev. 448 (1959) with Opinion of
the Justices, 337 Mass. 796, 151 N.E.2d 631 (1958). See in general, Jaffe, op.
cit. supra at Note 6; McBain, Law Making by Private Groups, 36 Pol. Sci. 617
(1921) ; Note 67 Harv. L. Rev. 1398 (1954); 1 Davis, Administrative Law
§ 2.14 (West Publishing Co. 1954).
8 Compare Shelton v. Tucker, 81 S. Ct. 247 (1961) with Breard v. City of
Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1955). See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of
Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 19 (1959).
9 341 U.S. 622 (1955). Cf. Green v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 492 (1959).
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was an unconstitutional interference with the right to engage in one
of the common occupations of life. "We think that even a legitimate
occupation may be restricted or prohibited in the public interest ....
The problem is legislative where there are reasonable bases for legislative action."' 0
The Massachusetts court views comparable restrictions in the State
Constitution1 1 in the same light. The test of constitutionality is not
that of the wisdom of the legislative choice. "It is not for us to inquire
into the expediency or the wisdom of the legislative judgment. Unless
the act of the legislature cannot be supported upon any rational basis
of fact that reasonably can be conceived to sustain it, the court has no
power to strike it down .... "12 And the same court has applied this
standard without hesitation to legislation restricting occupational
3
entry.'
The Massachusetts Constitution contains a special provision that
"No man, nor corporation, or association of men have any other title
to obtain advantages, or particular and exclusive privileges distinct
from those of the community, than what arises from the consideration
of services rendered to the public .... -14 On the doctrinal level it is
clear that legislative grants of monopolies or special privileges should
pose no problem calling for special constitutional formulations. As
before, the sole question is whether the legislature acted reasonably in
1D Id. at 632-633. Cf. Mr. Justice Brandeis dissenting in New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 280 et seq. (1932). Justices Black and Douglas dissented urging that the application of the ordinance to convict a magazine salesman unconstitutionally abridged free speech guarantees. But Justice Black added
(in a footnote) "Of course I believe that the present ordinance could constitutionally be applied to a 'merchant' who goes from door to door selling pots."
341 U.S. at 650. Apparently, then no member of the Court is willing to accord
"the right to engage in any of the common callings of life" a "preferred status"
in the constitutional scheme. See Hand, The Bill of Rights 50-55 (Harvard University Press, 1958).
11 Mass. Const. Part I, Art. 1 ("All men are born free and equal, and have
certain natural, essential and inalienable rights; among which may be reckoned
the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring,
possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their
safety, and happiness") ; Art. 10. ("Each individual of the society has a right to
be protected by it in the enjoyment of his life, liberty and property according to

standing laws . . .") ; Art. 12. (". . .. And no subject shall be . . . deprived of
his property, immunities or privileges . . . but by . . . the law of the land").

12 Sperry & Hutchinson v. Director, Nec. of Life, 307 Mass. 408, 418, 30 N.E.2d
268 (1940). See Merit Oil Co. v. Director, Nec. of Life, 319 Mass. 301, 304-305,
65 N.E.2d 529 (1946). Cf. Commonwealth v. Ferris, 305 Mass. 233, 235, 25
N.E.2d 378 (1940).
13 Opinion of the Justices, 322 Mass. 755, 760, 79 N.E.2d 883 (1948).
"The
test .. .to which resort is generally had to determine the constitutional validity
of the restrictions upon the carrying on of otherwise lawful occupations . .. is
whether the act has a national tendency to promote the safety, health, morals

and general welfare of the public." Accord. Commonwealth v. Finnegan, 326
Mass. 378, 379, 96 N.E.2d 715 (1951).
14 Mass. Const. Part I, Amend. VI.
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choosing the questioned device as a means of promoting the common
good. 15 Without exception the decisions of the Massachusetts court
are in accord with this rationale. Since the beginning of the nineteenth
century, judges have treated this clause as barring only awards of
special privileges which are unrelated to the public welfare.' 6 The
result is, in effect, that the clause is treated as surplusage, adding nothing to the other constitutional inhibitions on the legislature.
While the role of courts is thus seen to be a limited one, judicial
control of legislative activity-to the extent that it exists at all-is far
more likely to emanate from the state courts than from the federal
courts. "Economic Due Process" is not quite dead in the state courts.
For example, in 1949 the Massachusetts court advised that a proposed
bill which would have prohibited any cemetery association from engaging in the business of selling monuments for cemetery lots could not be
sustained as a valid exercise of the police power. 17 The rationale of the
opinion is quite interesting.
We have been unable to perceive in the proposed act any
rational tendency to promote the safety, health, morals or general
welfare of the public. Certainly it is not a health regulation. We
do not see what evil arises if any individual or religious society
owning or operating a cemetery also sells monuments .

. .

. It is

common for an individual or group of individuals to engage in
more than one lawful occupation. And we see no incompatability
between the two occupations here involved which might be thought
to operate to the public detriment. If it is suggested that a bereaved
family seeking a place to bury their dead might possibly be exposed
to undesirable importunity in the matter of purchase of a monument or might be discriminated against for refusal to buy, it might
equally well be argued that for similar reasons an undertaker
should be forbidden to sell caskets or a lawyer to act as administrator. Equal grounds exist for the separation of many forms of
activity which are commonly carried on together without objection .

. .

. The reason just suggested or the proposed act seems

fanciful rather than real ....

as

15 The power of the legislature to grant monopolies and special privileges
where the public interest would be served has been assumed since earliest times
(e.g., Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 37 U.S. 519, 595 (1839), and does not run afoul
of the Fourteenth Amendment (Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872) ; Cf.
Brandeis, J., dissenting in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 260, 280,
304-305 (1932).
16 The leading case is an opinion by Chief Justice Shaw in Comm. v. Blackington, 41 Mass. (24 Pick.) 352 (1837). See also Hewitt v. Charier, 33 Mass.
(16 Pick.) 353 (1835) ; Decie v. Brown, 167 Mass. 290, 291, 45 N.E. 765
(1897); Landers v. Eastern Racing Ass'n., 327 Mass. 32, 46, 97 N.E.2d 385
(1951)
Cf. McNamara v. Director of Civil Service, 330 Mass. 22, 110 N.E.2d
840 (1953).
'T Opinion of the Justices, 322 Mass. 755, 79 N.E.2d 883 (1948).
See in
general, Carpenter, Economic Due Process and the State Courts, 45 ABA J. 1027
(1959).
18 Id. at 760-761.
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It seems clear from the federal cases to be noted below that the Supreme Court would have found the "fanciful" reasons advanced sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. While
both courts purport to apply the same yardstick in adjudging constitutionality, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the local state
court judges, immediately aware of the realities behind the various
pieces of legislation, occasionally slip into requiring a "higher" measure
of "reasonableness" for state legislation than does the Supreme Court.
That Court now assiduously rejects any role as a "super-legislature,"
and frankly recognizes that, by and large, recourse must be had to the
normal political processes to rectify abuses by state legislatures.' 9
Daniel v. Family Life Insurance Co., 2 0 also decided in 1949, graphically illustrates the general approach of the Supreme Court in this
area, and stands in sharp contrast with the cemetery association case.
This decision involved a state statute which prohibited undertakers
from serving as agents for life insurance companies. A special three21
judge federal district court invalidated the act, one judge dissenting.
The lower court majority2 2 found that the legislation had no rational
relation to the public welfare, and in fact was an anti-competitive bill
aimed directly at the plaintiff which had enjoyed remarkable success
in using undertakers as selling agents for small, actuarially sound
burial policies. On a direct appeal, the judgment was unanimously
reversed. The opinion for the court began by restating the timehonored maxim that the motives of the legislators were beyond judicial
scrutiny. The constitutional question was then summarily handled.
"We cannot say that South Carolina is not entitled to call the funeral
insurance business an evil. Nor can we say that the statute has no rela23
tion to the elimination of those evils. There our inquiry must stop."1
Any attack based upon the Equal Protection Clause2 4 instead of the
19 Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955).
20
21

336 U.S. 220 (1949).
79 F. Supp. 62 (E.D.S.C. 1948).

22 Interestingly, the majority was composed of the two local federal judges,
whereas the dissenter was Circuit Judge Dobie.
23 Daniel v. Family Life Insurance Co., 336 U.S. 220, 224 (1949).
24 It is open to question whether formulation of an argument in terms of the
Equal Protection Clause rather than the Due Process Clause is now of any importance. Some decisions of the Supreme Court have asserted that the scope of
the two clauses is not identical. Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U.S. 329, 337
(1943) ; Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943) ; cf. the excellent
concurring opinion of Jackson, J., in Railway Express Agency v. New York,
336 U.S. 106, 111 (1949). But it would seem that the decisions have in fact led
to a coalescence of the two clauses. Substantively, the Due Process Clause bans
unreasonable legislation, and an important factor in determining unreasonableness
is an analysis of the discriminations which the statute sanctions. Under either
clause unreasonable discrimination will vitiate the legislation. See Hand, op. cit.,
supra note 10 at 56; cf. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
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Due Process Clause, seems equally doomed to certain failure. In view
of the recent decisions of the high court, it seems fair to conclude that
there is no real vitality left in that clause insofar as it purports to limit
state control over any type of business activity.
Railway Express Agency v. New York 25 affords a striking illustration of the general lifelessness of the Equal Protection Clause in this
area. A municipal ordinance banned advertising vehicles from the public
streets, except for vehicles primarily engaged in carrying on the advertiser's business. The American Express vehicles carried the advertising of others than itself and thus fell squarely within the legislative
interdiction. No one had difficulty with the proposition that New York
City could completely bar all advertising by vehicles. But the Express
Company argued that the exception in favor of owners who advertised
their own businesses amounted to a denial of the equal protection of the
laws. They claimed that if the ordinance was designed to reduce traffic
hazards, an Express Company vehicle carrying advertisements of a commercial house was in exactly the same position as a commercial house's
vehicle carrying advertisements on its own trucks. Mr. Justice Douglas
wrote the opinion for the Court. He rejected the argument of the Express Company as a "superficial way" 20 of analyzing the problem.
The local authorities may well have concluded that those who
advertised their own wares on their trucks do not present the same
traffic problem in view of the nature or extent of the advertising
which they use. It would take a degree of omniscience which we
lack, to say that such is not the case. If that judgment is correct,
the advertising displays that are exempt have less incidents on
traffic than those of appellants.
We cannot say that the judgment is not an allowable one. Yet,
if it is, the classification . . . does not contain the kind of discrimi-

nation against which the Equal Protection Clause affords protection. It is by such practical considerations based on experience
rather than by theoretical inconsistencies that the question of equal
protection is to be answered. 27
The crucial point in the "Equal Protection" philosophy of Railway
Express comes to this: the legislature need not eliminate all evils of
the same kind in order to eliminate some of the evils; it may eliminate
a part of traffic advertising without eliminating all of it if there is any
"rational" basis for the distinctions drawn. As the Court stated in a
later case, ".

.

. reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to

the phase of the problem which seems most acute in the legislative
25
26

27

336 U.S. 106 (1949).
Id. at 110.

Ibid.
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mind."'28 This conception of the Equal Protection Clause2 eliminates it
3
as a rigorous restraining influence on state action .
The Supreme Court's marked reluctance to intervene here stems from
a well thought out, deeply felt concern for the requirements of a viable
federalism. For years Holmes and Brandeis had filed dissenting opinions urging that the states must be given great leeway in dealing with
their social and economic problems. 3l The views expressed in these dissents subsequently became the accepted philosophy of the court. Writing for a unanimous bench in Day-Brite Lighting Co. v Missouri,32 Mr.
Justice Douglas observed:
Our recent decisions make it plain that we do not sit as a superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation nor to decide whether
the policy which it expresses offends the public welfare. The legislative power has limits ...

but the state legislatures have constitu-

tional authority to experiment with new techniques; they are entitled to their own standards of the public welfare; they may within
extremely broad limits control practices in the business-labor field,
so long as specific constitutional prohibitions are not violated and
so long 33as conflicts with valid and controlling federal laws are
avoided.
28

Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955).

Doud, 354

Cf. Morey v.
; Kotch

U.S. 457, 465 (1957) ; Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948)

v. River Port Pilots Commissioners, 330 U.S. 552 (1947).
29 This view of the Equal Protection Clause had been most strongly urged
by Mr. Justice Holmes. "[T]he Legislature . . . may direct its law against what
it deems the evil as it actually exists without covering the whole field of possible
abuses, and it may do so nonetheless that the forbidden act does not differ in kind
from those that are allowed. Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U.S. 157,
160 (1912). See also the opinions of Mr. Justice Holmes in Weaver v. Palmer
Bros. Co., 270 U.S. 402, 415-416 (1926), and Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208
(1927).
30 Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957) (three justices dissenting), does not
detract" from this analysis. In that case the court invalidated the Illinois Community Currency Exchanges Act, which required firms selling or issuing money
orders in the state to secure a license and submit to state regulation, but excepted
the American Express Company from these requirements. After repeating the
principles stated in the earlier cases, the majority struck down the statute because
the exception was not an open-ended class. American Express Company was
excepted irrespective of whether it continued to stay financially sound, and other
companies would be still subjected to the licensing requirements "even though
their characteristics are, or become, substantially identical with those the American
Express Company now has." Id. at 467. It seems clear to me that all that is
involved is a drafting problem. Illinois can accomplish its objective by redrafting
the statute but making the exception an open-ended class at least in theory.
31 "There is nothing that I more deprecate than the use of the Fourteenth
Amendment beyond the absolute compulsion of its words to prevent the making
of social experiments that an important part of the community desires, in the
insulated chambers afforded by the several states, even though the experiment
may seem futile or noxious to me and to those whose judgment I most respect."
Holmes, J., dissenting in Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 344 (1921). See also
Mr. Justice Holmes dissenting in Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230, 241
(1926), and Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 445-447 (1927).
32 342 U.S. 421 (1952).
33 Id. at 423. Cf. Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal
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The Supreme Court fully recognizes that to invalidate state legislation
on federal constitutional grounds is to give a ring of finality not found in
the constitutional decisions of the state courts, which are of course far
more amenable to correction by constitutional amendment than are
federal constitutional decisions.
II

The continuous growth of the occupational license as a method for
restricting entry into an occupation is, in its own way, an arresting
social phenomenon. Occupation after occupation is withdrawn from un4
restricted access by requiring a license as a prerequisite to entrance.3
The characteristic of this type of license is approval by a state board,
upon a showing that the applicant has met certain requirements of education, experience, or examination."5 Thus stated, the objective is to
insure a minimum level of competence on the part of the members of
the occupational group. But the continuous expansion of occupational
licensing is now a source of increasing concern since institutionally it
stands ready made to protect the economic interests of the occupational
group against the competition resulting from free entry into the occupation, and perhaps even stands ready as a method for the control of competitive activity within the occupational group. Thus, a denial of a license
may keep down the number of barbers, and the threat of a license revocation may serve as a sanction to enforce regulations as to the prices
Co., 335 U.S. 525, 536-537 (1949) ; Daniel v. Family Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220,
224 (1949).
34 The Supreme Court long ago applied the general principles of constitutional law discussed above to the question of occupational licensing. In the
leading case, Mr. Justice Field elaborated on the basic considerations at some
length. "The power of the State to provide for the general welfare of its people
authorizes it to prescribe all such regulations as, in its judgment, will secure or
tend to secure them against the consequences of ignorance and incapacity as well
as of deception and fraud. As one means to this end it has been the practice of
different states, from time immemorial to exact in many pursuits a certain degree
of skill and learning upon which the community may confidently rely, their possession being generally ascertained upon an examination of parties by competent
persons, or inferred from a certificate to them in the form of a diploma or license
from an institution . . . . The nature and extent of the qualifications required
must depend primarily upon the judgment of the State as to their necessity."
Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122 (1889) ; Cf. Graves v. Minnesota, 272
U.S. 425 (1926).
35 "The occupations with which this survey is concerned are subject to the
following conditions:
1. A -license must be secured from the state authorizing the practice of a certain
skill or the assumption of a particular title.
2. A person applying for such an occupational license must either
(a) have met certain educational qualifications, or
(b) have met certain experience requirements, or
(c) have passed an examination, or
(d) have attained some combination of these requirements as determined by
law. (The Council of State Governments, Occupational Licensing Legislation in the States, p. 7 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Report]).

OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING
charged and the hours that the shop may be kept open. "Competency,"
then, may be but a euphemism for economic control of the trade group.a6
A general survey of the history of occupational licensing statutes, is
illuminating. Until the end of the nineteenth century few occupations,
save for law and medicine, were subject to license. But by the middle
of the present century the statute books were top heavy with licensing
laws. A somewhat dismayed student of the process laments that:
One may not be surprised to learn that pharmacists, accountants,
and dentists have been reached by state laws, as have sanitarians,
and psychologists, assayers, and architects, veterinarians and librarians. But with what joy of discovery does one learn about the
licensing of threshing machine operators and dealers in scrap tobacco? What of egg graders and guide-dog trainers, pest controllers, and yacht salesmen, tree surgeons and well diggers; tile layers
and potato growers? And what of the hypertrichologists who are
licensed in Connecticut where they remove excessive and unsightly
37
hairs with the solemnity appropriate to their high-sounding title.
The occupational license can, of course, serve a variety of useful functions. Traditionally, it has effectuated the legitimate goals of protecting
the public safety and well-being from incompetence, fraud and dishonesty.38 Furthermore, it often provides the average citizen of limited
means with a swift and inexpensive administrative avenue for redress
against the licensee. The complainant frequently need not go through
the costly, time-consuming, delay-ridden court processes when the licensee is concerned about an adverse report to the licensing authorities.

9

At the same time, however, occupational licensing can protect

the economic position of the occupational group under the smoke screen
of fostering the public welfare. It is the use of the occupational license
as a method for limiting competition through control over entry into the
occupation, and, where possible, use of the licensing structure to control
competitive activity within the group which have led numerous writers
to conjure up visions of the rebirth of the guild system-the classic example of integrated group control over its competitive status. 40 It is
36 Gellhorn, Individual Freedom and Governmental Restraint, 105-151 (Louisiana State University Press 1956); Grant, The Guild Returns to America, 4
Journal of Politics 303, 458 (1942); Doyle, Fence-Me-In-Laws, 205 Harpers 89
(August 1952). The law reviews contain several valuable studies; Hanft & Hamrick, Haphazard Regimentation under Licensing Statutes, 17 N.C.L. Rev.
(1938); Graves, Professional and Occupational Restrictions, 13 Temp. L.Q. 334
(1939) ; Notes, 29 Neb. L. Rev. 146 (1949), 38 Iowa L. Rev. 556 (1953). There
is an extensive collection of source materials in Report op cit., supra, note 35
at 104-106.
37 Gellhorn, op. cit., supra, note 36 at 106.
38 Report, op. cit., supra, note 35 at 3.

39 Ibid.

40 Grant, op. cit., supra, note 36; Report, op. cit., supra, note 35 at 10-19.
Gellhorn, op. cit., supra, note 36 at 113-115.
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with little amusement that one reads the comment of a Wisconsin legislator that her six-year-old boy could no longer reasonably aspire to be a
watchmaker though, fortunately, he might still hope to become Presi41
dent.
It seems that in the final analysis no clear-cut over-all picture of the
occupational licensing process emerges. As has been seen, legitimate
public interests may be fostered by the process. Often, however, the
interests of the occupational group alone are involved. Any given occupational licensing statute can usually be seen to involve a mixture of
both ingredients. Yet there seem to be some situations where the public
interests served are minimal. In this regard Professor Gellhorn concludes:
The philosophy of free competition has dominated the economic
growth of America. Of course, it has never become an obsession.
Nonetheless, except in the cases of the so-called "natural" monopolies, governmental influence has traditionally been used to support
and not to limit competition, to encourage and not to restrict personal, economic and social mobility ....
The thrust of occupational licensing, like that of the guilds, is
toward decreasing competition by restricting access to the occupation; toward a definition of occupational prerogatives that will bar
others from sharing in them; toward attaching legal consequences
to essentially private determinations
of what are ethically or eco42
nomically permissible practices.
In any evaluation of the public interest-private interest tension which
has marked the extension of occupational licensing, a clear understanding of the pressures generating occupational licensing legislation is desirable. 43 Students of the process unanimously agree that the prime
impetus for the creation of a state board to administer standards for
entry into an occupation emanates from the occupational group itself,
and not from any widespread public demand. Licensing requirements
are not imposed on the group. Recent Massachusetts experiments are
typically illustrative. For example, Professor Gellhorn's hypertrichologists began a campaign in 1954 to protect the public health from the
41 Cf. Doyle, op. cit., supra, note 36 at 114.
42

Gellhorn, op. cit., supra note 36 at 114.

43 E.g., Report, op. cit., supra, note 35 at 57; Gellhorn, op. cit., supra, note 36

at 110. "Did the legislators after examination of the needs of society come by
themselves to the conclusion that trained and qualified chiropodists are vital to
the public interest? Or that tile floor and walls, as distinguished from any other
floor and walls, ought in the public interest to be laid only by carefully examined
and duly licensed layers? Or that boughten photographers are so closely connected with the general welfare that only licensed persons should be allowed to
take photographs for a price, whereas anyone may take them for himself? Did
the man on the street put pressure on his representatives in the legislature to
protect him from unlicensed chiropodists, tile layers, and photographers?" Hanft
and Hamrick, op. cit., supra, note 36 at 4.
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dangers of future unlicensed practitioners. In that year one Paul
44
Wallace introduced a bill "for regulating the practice of electrolysis,
as did Joan Weinrib 45 who sought, however, to extend the jurisdiction
of the existing board of registration of hairdressers to cover hair removers as well. No action was taken on either proposal. One year later
the Association of Electrolygists, Inc., succeeded in introducing a petition in the Senate for the creation of a state licensing board,46 but the
House received a Committee report which would have allowed the practice only if performed under the supervision of a physician. 47 Here
then is an unusual occupation, thought by some to be akin to medicine
and by others to hair dressing. In 1956 several hypertrichological bills
were introduced but no action was taken. 48 Nineteen hundred and fiftyseven proved to be a year of unmitigated disaster for the electrolygists.
Mr. Wallace and one Mabel Long had introduced separate petitions
in both branches of the Legislature. 49 But the Committee on Ways and
Means reported unfavorably on the proposed legislation,5" and five days
later the House delivered a crushing 49-10 vote against the bill. 5'
Undaunted by this setback, Paul Wallace, et al., saw to it that new
52
petitions were filed at the opening of the 1958 legislative session.
For some reason or other, history did an abrupt about-face. This time
the Committee Report was favorable, 53 and the final bill passed with
ease. 54 Constant and increasing pressure on the legislature finally
produced the desired results.
The motivation supporting the occupational group's interest in being
subjected to state licensing laws is two-fold: the desire for economic
security and the quest for social recognition.
Little need be said of the desire for economic protection. Numerous
writers have pointed out that the typical American's attitude toward
competition is that it is a wonderful idea for everyone-except himself.55 Controlling occupational entry through rigorous entrance prerequisites and group control over the competitive activities of the
occupational group are obvious means of protecting group economic in44 1954 Journal of the Senate 171; 1954 Journal of the House 151.
45 1954 Journal of the Senate 45; 1954 Journal of the House 234.
46

1955 Journal of the Senate 178.

47 1955 Journal of the House 1106.

1956 Journal of the Senate 988; 1956 Journal of the House 1387, 1398.
1957 Journal of the Senate 195; 1957 Journal of the House 182.
50 1957 Journal of the House 1412.
48
49
51

Id. at 1447.

52 1958 Journal of the Senate 44, 182; 1958 Journal of the House 162.
53 1958 Journal of the House 1470, 1894 (amended version).
54 1958 Journal of the Senate 1436; 1958 Journal of the House 1909.
55 See e.g., Stocking, The Rule of Reason, Workable Competition, and The
Legality of Trade Association Activities, 21 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 527, 539-540
(1954) ; Galbraith, The Affluent Society, 100-110.
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terests. An equally common example of the drive for economic security
is the traditional fight of the licensed occupation against "new" occupational groups which are sufficiently related to the older occupational activity so as to be viewed as competitors.56 A less obvious manifestation
of the desire for economic protection is seen in the movement from
optional certification to compulsory licensing. (Unlike compulsory licensing, optional certification does not preclude the practice of the activity but merely prevents anyone from holding himself out as possessing
certain qualifications unless he obtains a certificate.).7 A recent experience in Massachusetts illustrates this latter trend nicely. Prior to 1958
the statutes did not condition the practice of engineering upon obtaining a license, but if the registration requirements were satisfied the
licensee would possess the title of registered professional engineer.5 In
1958 a bill was pushed through the legislature which (save for exceptions dictated by necessity) made a license a prerequisite to any practice
of the occupation. 59
Of considerable interest are the psychological factors which are at
the root of most recent attempts by groups to obtain occupational licensing. Indeed, while it may be hazardous to make the generalization
here, my impression is that at least originally the prime group motivation in seeking the occupational license is not grounded in thoughts of
economic discrimination (this is a later development), but rather reflects
a deeply rooted group quest for status. As the group becomes conscious
of its own identity, it feels impelled to proclaim its uniqueness and selfimportance. The occupational license is viewed by the group as a
method for obtaining social status. The drive to be recognized as not
merely a member of the polloi is quite pervasive. For example, a representative of the barbers cautions us that barbers cannot be classified as
within the ranks of ordinary humanity:
We are not laboring people. Our work requires a certain learned
knowledge, and is requiring more all the time. We must be skillful
in certain movements and manipulations of the hands and fingers.
It requires a certain skillful technique in the use of delicate tools,
instruments and appliances. It requires adaptation and coordination of eye and brain, nerve and muscle. We are not laboring people. We are building a profession.60
56 Witness for example the unsuccessful attempts of the chiropractor in Massachusetts. Commonwealth v. Anthony, 333 Mass. 175, 129 N.E.2d 914 (1955), appeal
dismissed 351 U.S. 916. See also the successful attempts at tightening up the definition of what constitutes the practice of dentistry. Commonwealth v. Finnegan,
326 Mass. 378, 96 N.E.2d 715 (1950).
57 Report, op. cit., supra, note 35 at 24.
58 St. 1941, c. 643, § 2; c. 722 § 9c.
59 St. 1958, c. 584, § 10, amending Mass. G.L., c. 112, § 81 T.
60 19 Master Barber Mag. 7 (April 1959).
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Not to be outdone, the policeman demands his proper place in the sun.
"We aren't watchmen, that's for sure. The Army officer has professional recognition so why not the police officer?"61 Professor Fellman
observes that occupational groups:
• . . seek the social and psychological satisfaction which they
think will come from elevating a humble and honorable trade into a
profession, replete with examinations, standards, boards, and a terminology smacking of the scientific. Regulation is not merely a
matter of external restraint, it is also a product of the group quest
for status and security. The assertion 62of integrated group interests
is a characteristic feature of our times.
Professor Gellhorn sums up the phenomena with his usual incisive humor: "Be he chiropodist or chiropractor, tile layer or horseshoer, photographer or watchmaker, dry cleaner or embalmer, the sound man may
yearn for professional status and social advancement. '6 3 In Massachu64
setts the recent addition of a board of registration for sanitarians
seems to be a good example of a group quest for status. The statutory
setup at present seems to do little more than to provide a scheme allowing the members to call themselves registered sanitarians, and to write
65
"R.S." after their names.
An awareness of the real source of occupational licensing legislation
and the causes for its extension must not be viewed as providing us with
any automatic answer to the policy considerations involved. To begin
with, it would often be the grossest oversimplification to limit motivation
to one or a few factors. Unquestionably in a great many cases members of the occupational group seeking licensing legislation have a genuine concern for protecting the public welfare, whether or not this concern is intertwined with desires for economic security and status. And
furthermore, the crucial question for the legislature and the courts is not
the motivation of the proponents of legislation, but the objective relationship between the legislation sought and the public welfare. 66
III
Turning more specifically to an examination of the occupational
licensing structure in Massachusetts, one is immediately struck by the
ever-widening circle of occupations subjected to licensing requirements.
Massachusetts provides for a Division of Registration as a part of the
61 New York Times, June 22, 1956, p. 20, Col. 1.
62 Fellman, op. cit., supra, note 36 at 124.
63 Gellhorn, op. cit., supra, note 36 at 109.
64 Mass. G.L., c. 112, §§ 8711 to 8700. This is now an "optional certification"
statute but it is safe to predict that in the future, once the occupational group
"matures," this will develop into a compulsory licensing system.
65 Mass. G.L., c. 112, § 8700.
66 See, e.g., Robert, op. cit., supra, note 35 at 57.
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Department of Civil Service. Within the division are the boards of
registration and examination for: medicine (and physical therapy),
chiropody, nursing, optometry, dentistry, pharmacy, veterinary medicine, embalming and funeral directing, electricians, certified public accountants, plumbers, barbers, hairdressers, architects, and professional
engineers and land surveyors. 67 Recent legislative activity has further
expanded this list. In 1955 the dispensing opticians came under a
board of registration, 68 and in 1957 boards of registration for sanitation experts, and real estate brokers and agents were added. 9
By and large the various boards are composed entirely of members
of the regulated group.70 Interestingly, one member of the Board of
Registration in chiropody must be a physician, 71 and one member of the
Real Estate Board must be a lawyer. 72 One would not need to be a
cynic to conclude that at least a partial explanation for their presence
is to protect the interests of their own professions. An exception to occupational group dominance in the state boards is the Board of Registration
and examination of electricians. Here a majority of the five members
73
could be classified as representatives of the public.
The mechanics of operation of the various boards afford interesting
contrasts in public administration. The principal source of information
we have as to the actual operations of the boards is the annual report
each files. At one time the boards submitted reports which were available for public distribution, but this is no longer the practice. The only
available reports are typewritten copies at the State House Library.
Some boards apparently no longer regularly submit annual reports. The
reports themselves exhibit no consistent pattern and vary widely in helpfulness, some being quite elaborate, others being of a most perfunctory
nature.7 4 As expected, the reports indicate that some boards meet often,
others but a few days a year. The figures of the various boards on their
67 Mass. G.L., c. 13, §§ 10-11 (medicine and physical therapy), §§ 12A and B
(chiropody), §§ 13-15A (nursing), §§ 16-18 (optometry), §§ 19-21 (dentistry),
§§ 22-25 (pharmacy), §§ 26-28 (veterinary medicine), §§ 29-31 (embalming
and funeral directing), § 32 (electricians), §§ 33-35 (certified public accountants), §§ 36-38 (plumbers), §§ 39-41 (barbers), §§ 42-44 (hairdressers),
§§ 44A-44D (architects), §§ 45-47 (professional engineers and land surveyors),
MGLA c. 112, § 1 et seq., contains the substantive provisions governing occupational licensing in Massachusetts.
68 Mass. G.L., c. 13, §§ 48-50.
69 Mass. G.L., c. 13, §§ 51-53 (sanitation experts), §§ 54-57 (real estate brokers and agents).
70 E.g., Mass. G.L. c. 13, § 32 (hairdressers). There are a few exceptions.
For example, the board of registration in nursing has one physician as a member.
Mass. G.L., c. 13, § 13.
71 Mass. G.L., c. 13, § 12A.
72 Mass. G.L., c. 13, § 54.
73 Mass. G.L., c. 13, § 32.
74 E.g., compare 1957 Public Document No. 91 (Nursing) with 1958 Public
Document No. 158 (Podiatry).
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economic status are interesting. For example, the licensing board for
electricians accumulated receipts of over $73,000 for fiscal 1957, $14,000
more than its total expenditures. 75 On the other hand, the licensing
board for veterinarians expended only $3,100 for fiscal 1958, but this
76
was still $500 more than its receipts.
As we have seen, any expectation of a wholesale judicial assault upon
the extension of occupational licensing statutes is unrealistic, especially
on the federal constitutional level. But to say that the courts have but a
limited role is not to say that they have no role at all. We may still hope
that at least the uncommitted state courts would invalidate in toto
occupational licensing statutes for such groups as dry cleaners, professional photographers, tile layers, and grocery store operators. It is
indeed difficult to see any sufficient interest for legislative imposition of
minimum levels of "competence" on these occupations when this is
viewed against the traditional right of the free man to engage in any of
the common callings." The public interest is adequately protected here
by the forces of competition. Furthermore, both the federal and state
courts can fulfill a vital function by striking down discriminatory and
indefensible provisions in an otherwise constitutional statute. And it is
with this last consideration in mind that we now examine some of the
particular qualifications for entry into an occupation prevalent in the
Massachusetts statutes.

IV
A common provision in the licensing laws bars aliens from the permanent practice of the occupation. 78 It is of course difficult to ascertain
just how widespread are the consequences of such a ban, but the 1957
report submitted by the Board of Registration in nursing showed that the
licenses of 14 registered nurses and 2 practical nurses were revoked for
failure to satisfy citizenship requirements-despite the fact that the
report exhibited great concern over the nursing shortage. 79
The Attorney General of Massachusetts seems firmly committed to
the view that such citizenship requirements are valid." So does the
state court. In 1907 the Supreme Judicial Court upheld the validity of a
75

1957 Public Document No. 157, p. 3.

76 1957 Public Document No. 72, p. 2. The number of persons passing the

various examinations showed equally wide variations. For example, of 153
prospective dentists examined in 1957 only 2 failed (1958 Public Document No.
38, p. 3), whereas the board of registration and examination for electricians passed
only 679 out of 1126 applicants in 1957 (1958 Annual Report of the Board of
Registration for Electricians for the year ending June 30, 1957, p. 2).
77 But cf. Gellhorn, op. cit., supra, note 36 at 122-123 who would remove the
courts entirely from these considerations.
78 E.g., Mass. G.L., c. 112, §§ 2 (physicians and surgeons), 23 c. (physical
therapists), 87 GGG (electrologists).
79

1957 Public Document No. 91, pp. 3, 14.

80 1942 Op. Atty. Gen. 103, cf. 1956 Op. Atty. Gen. 29; 1939 Op. Atty. Gen. 76.
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statute which restricted hawker's and peddler's licenses to citizens and
would-be-citizens.8 1 Nine years later the same court sustained provisions in a labor law requiring state departments, agencies, cities and
towns, as well as their private contractors doing construction work, to
82
give preference in employment to citizens of the Commonwealth.
Whatever support previous rulings of the United States Supreme
Court gave to the federal constitutionality of acts restricting the right
of an alien to work,8 3 Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission,8 4 seems
to indicate that, at least insofar as most occupations are concerned,
the right to work cannot be tied to the right to vote. In voiding a
California statute which prohibited the issuance of a fishing license to
any person ineligible for citizenship, the rationale of the majority
opinion leaves little doubt that few, if any, discriminations against an
alien's right to work will be upheld. The Court, after reiterating
the ancient dogma that the alien's right to work is protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment, 3 clearly stated that the test of classifications
discriminating against aliens is the orthodox test applied in all cases
of discrimination through classification-does the discrimination reflect
actual differences reasonably related to the objectives of the legislation.
The Court assumed that California had the power to restrict free
access to fishing waters as a reasonable conservation measure, but held
that discrimination against aliens bore no reasonable relationship to
86
the statutory objectives.
Perhaps a state may still constitutionally bar an alien from the practice of the "more learned" profession of medicine and dentistry, but this
seems to be doubtful at best.87 Since "law" has governmental connotations, a slightly stronger case could be made out for making citizenship
81 Commonwealth v. Hanna, 195 Mass. 261, 265-266, 81 N.E. 149 (1907).
82 Lee v. City of Lynn, 223 Mass. 109, 111 N.E. 700 (1916).
This was the
expressed view of the United States Supreme Court. Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S.

175 (1915) ; Crane v. New York, 239 U.S. 195 (1915).

Fellman, "The Alien's Right to Work," 22 Minn. L. Rev. 137 (1938).
334 U.S. 410 (1948), cf. Oyami v. California, 332 U.S. 663 (1948).
83 This was so held in the landmark case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356 (1886) and was specifically applied to the right of an alien to
engage in the common occupations of life in Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41
(1915). But subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court and the state courts
sanctioned ever increasing discrimination against the alien's claim to equal opportunities. See Fellman, op. cit., supra note, 83; Comment, Restrictions on Alien's
Right to Work, 57 Col. L. Rev. 1013 (1957).
86 The decision, in its narrowest terms, would seem to invalidate Mass. G.L.,
c. 130, § 38 insofar as it discriminates against aliens in the granting of licenses
for lobster fishing.
87 McIntyre, in Citizenship and Medical Licensure, 112 A.M.A.J. 1075 (1939)
justifies banning aliens from the practice of medicine on the theory that the
alien is not likely to be able to fulfill his social obligation to the community.
There is little doubt that this rationale is insufficient to justify the present discrimination against alien physicians. Restrictions on Aliens' Rights to Work, 57
Col. L. Rev. 1013, 1026 (1957) ; Gellhorn, op. cit., supra, note 36 at 126.
83
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a prerequisite to its practice. In any event, it now seems perfectly clear
that few discriminations against the alien's right to work on the same
basis as the citizen will survive a constitutional attack. 8s Professor
Gellhorn puts this view forcibly: "Not even a semblance of plausibility
supports an argument that chiropodists, tree surgeons, and embalmers
(among many others), must be eligible to vote before they may become
eligible to seek a license." 8 9 Perhaps the heart of the present attitude
of the Supreme Court was expressed in moving terms by Mr. Justice
Field sitting with the Circuit Court back in 1879." Decrying such
legislation as "unworthy of a brave and manly people," 91 he wrote:
It is certainly something in which a citizen of the United States
may feel a generous pride that the government of his country extends protection to all persons within its jurisdiction; and that
every blow aimed at any of them, however humble, come from
the broad shield of our blessed
what quarter it may, is "caught upon
'92
constitution and our equal laws."

Prospective physical therapists, embalmers, and electrolygists must
now possess a high school education.98 While this has an arguable
enough relationship to the public welfare so as to pass muster constitutionally, realistically it seems that the requirements serve as status
features designed to enhance the prestige of the occupation, and perhaps to a lesser extent to protect the economic security of the group.
The usual pattern in occupational licensing requires the prospective
entrant to satisfy certain apprenticeship and/or trade school training
requirements.9 4 The Massachusetts statutes afford typical illustrations
of both. In order to be certified as a licensed barber, a two-year
apprenticeship is necessary.9" A prospective embalmer must serve a
two-year apprenticeship under a registered embalmer after the completion of a nine month trade-school course. 90 The future dispensing
optician has the choice of one year in school or a three-year apprentice97
ship.
Both the trade school and apprenticeship requirements have been the
88 The comment in the Columbia Law Review, supra, note 87 suggests (at
1020-1021), that at least a certain amount of discrimination based on noncitizenship may still be permissible in government employment-at least in "sensitive" positions.
89 Gellhorn, op. cit., supra, note 38 at 126.
90 Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan, 12 Fed. Cas. 252 (C.C.D. Cal. 1879).
91 Id. at 256-257.

92 Id. at 256.
93 Mass. G.L., c. 112, §§ 23 (physical therapists), 83 (embalmers), 87 GGG

(electrolygists).
94 Report, op. cit., supra,
95 Mass. G.L., c. 112, §
96 Mass. G.L., c. 112, §
97 Mass. G.L., c. 112, §

note 35 at 49-50.
87.
83.
73.
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subject of considerable controversy. Insofar as trade school requirements are concerned, the Council of State Governments reports that:
"There is considerable disagreement within and without these occupations about the value of this type of training and about the amount of
time which students need to spend in such schools." 98 The feeling is
that the increasing use of trade school requirements often reflects
no more than the occupational group's monopolistic desires to prevent
easy access to the occupation. This seems especially true of the "barber
college." Professor Gellhorn writes:
Of eighteen representative states included in a study of barbering
regulations in 1929, not one then commanded an aspirant to be a
graduate of a "barber college." Today the states typically insist
upon graduation from a barbering school that provides not less
(and often much more) than 1000 hours of instruction in "theoretical subjects" such as sterilization of instruments, and this must
still be followed by apprenticeship. Opinions may differ about the
motives that underlie this striking shift from in-service to inschool training; but at least one man whose memory runs as far
back as 1929 doubts that barbering has risen to new heights
because of it.99
Perhaps of even more acute concern nationally are the often onerous
apprenticeships which must be served before a license will be issued.
The result may be to place a severe restraint on social mobility. Professor Gellhorn's observations here are well worth considering:
Parochialism is also antithetical to the American tradition.
Movement from place to place in pursuit of advancement or congeniality has always been an American prerogative. Observers
from more static societies, noting our mobility, think of us as
almost rootless. But licensing laws may soon anchor Americans
to a degree not hitherto experienced. Despite occasional judicial
remonstrance, many states require antecedent local residence as
a condition of license eligibility ....

The ultimate consequences are

at once apparent. No longer can the advice be given "Go west,
young man"-or east or north or south. If a young man is hopeful of engaging in a licensed occupation, he must remain where he
is in order to satisfy residence requirements. Especially is this
true when the apprenticeship is a necessary preliminary to achieving licensed status, for the apprenticeship must be served under
one who already possesses the coveted local license. 10
Undesirable and indefensible though some of the trade school requirements may be, it is particularly difficult to envisage the courts as an
98 Report, op. cit., supra, note 35 at 49.

99 Gellhorn, op. cit., supra, note 36 at 146.
100 Gellhorn, op. cit., supra, note 36 at 126-127. This is not identical with the
problem of licensing practitioners from other states, although there is some overlap in the problems involved. See Report, op. cit., supra, note 35 at 54-56.
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effective check here. Once it is conceded that some trade school and/or
apprenticeship qualifications can be imposed upon a particular occupation, it is hard to see how the courts can separate reasonable
periods from unreasonable ones, except perhaps in the clearest cases.
The result is that these methods for discouraging occupational entry
seem particularly invulnerable to judicial scrutiny. The Supreme Court
early recognized this fact. "The nature and extent of the qualifications
required must depend primarily upon the judgment of the State as
to their necessity . . . . It is only when they have no relation to such
calling or profession, or are unascertainable by . . . reasonable study

and application, that they can operate to deprive one of his right to
pursue a lawful calling."'' 1
Finally we might observe that good moral character is required of
physicians, physical therapists, architects, embalmers, nurses, veterinarians, chiropodists, and real estate brokers, 1 2 but of no others, if
we take the statutes literally. And features common to most Massachusetts occupational licensing schemes provide for revocation of the
license for specified violations of the criminal laws, or for crimes in03
volving moral turpitude.'
V
The primary concern of this paper has thus far focused on control
of entry into the occupational group. However, the inevitable trend
of any firmly entrenched occupational group seems to be to seek control
over the competitive activities of the occupational group itself.' 4 The
most salient example of control over competitive activity may be found
in the numerous provisions barring advertising among members of the
occupational group. 10 5
The constitutionality of prohibiting advertising among professional
men is not open to doubt. In 1939 the question was examined at
101 Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122 (1888). Cf. Graves v. Minnesota,
272 U.S. 425 (1926).
102 Mass. G.L., c. 112, § 2 (physicians), § 16 (chiropodists), § 23c (physical
therapists), § 55 (veterinarians), § 60B (architects), § 74 (nurses), § 83 (embalmers), § 87 TTT (real estate brokers).
(physical ther103 E.g., Mass. G.L., c. 112, § 18 (chiropodists), § 23H(d)
apists), § 73H (dispensing opticians), § 84 (embalmers). For a collection of the
statutes see Delegation of Discretion in Massachusetts Licensing Statutes, 43
Harv. L. Rev. 302, 305 (1929). For the constitutional and social policy questions involved in automatic occupational door closing for the commission of
certain crimes, see Gellhorn, op. cit., supra, note 36 at 128-129, and Barsky v.
Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954).
104 In a sense current occupational licensing effects a three-fold development.
Licensing is first used to enhance the social status of the occupational group. At
a later stage, it is used to control entry into the occupation. Finally it emerges
as a method for controlling competitive activity within the group itself.
105 E.g., Mass. G.L., c. 112, § 19(d) (chiropody), § 23K (physical therapy).
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length in Commonwealth v. Brown,'0 8 where the Massachusetts court
unanimously concluded that the ban was a reasonable measure designed
to protect the public against the claims of charlatans and defrauders.
The United States Supreme Court dismissed the appeal "for want of
a substantial federal question.' u 7 While the older cases talk in terms
of prohibiting advertising among "professional" groups, it seems
perfectly clear that "professional" in this context means any group
that the state can constitutionally subject to licensing requirements.'"
It is common for advertising limitations to be extended to nonlicensed occupational groups who perform any services which are
related to the licensed activities. Perlow v. Board of Dental Examiners'0 9 affords an excellent illustration of the process. That case upheld
the validity of a statute which prohibited dental laboratories engaged
in the construction or repair of dentures from advertising to the public,
as distinguished from advertising to dentists. This had the obvious
economic effect of assuring dentists that repair work on dentures would
be channeled through, not past, their profession." 0 Commonwealth v.
Weiner"' is yet another illustration. Dispensing opticians complained
against statutory prohibitions of advertising at a single price lenses or
complete eyeglasses, including lenses, and of advertising a claim to a
poiicy of underselling competitors." 2 Apparently, the optometrists did
not feel strong enough at that time 113 to completely bar the sale of eyeglasses without a prescription, but they sought to achieve much the same
goal by the back door. The statute was upheld, the Court reasoning
that the legislature could have completely prohibited selling eyeglasses
without a prescription, and therefore could take the lesser step of just
"discouraging the business.""- 4 While there can be little doubt that
the measures in both cases bear a recognizable relationship to the public
welfare, they do provide rather clear examples of an effective method
used by licensees to protect their economic security. There is not, of
106 302 Mass. 523, 20 N.E.2d 478 (1939).
107 308 U.S. 504 (1939).
108 Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489-490 (1955).
109 332 Mass. 682, 127 N.E.2d 306 (1955).
110 See, Comment, Dentists, Dental Laboratories, and the Public Interest, 51
N.W. U. L. Rev. 123 (1956).
111 305 Mass. 233, 25 N.E.2d 378 (1940).
112 Mass. G.L., c. 112, § 73A.

113 Under the present law eyeglasses may be sold only by prescription. Mass.
G.L., c. 112, § 73C, added by St. 1955, c. 688, § 2. This is clearly constitutional.
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
114 "The legislature evidently was not prepared to prohibit the sale of eyeglasses and lenses as merchandise, to be selected by the buyer. But it was prepared to discourage it, by eliminating the temptation to and pressure upon customers that results from the assurance that no more than a named price will
be charged, or that the price is less than competitors ask .

is consistent with the Constitution."
Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).

. .

. [T]hat shorter step

305 Mass. at 237. Cf. Williamson v. Lee
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course, anything a priori wrong with such a development since, quite
often, fostering the public welfare coincides with a particular private
interest. 115 But there are situations where there is little more than a
"National" (i.e., "constitutional") connection between the privately
sponsored legislation and the public welfare, and it is in this area,
insulated as it is from judicial scrutiny, that the legislature should
tread most warily.
Other attempts by occupational groups to control competitive activity
have met with a good deal more judicial opposition. The barbers
have been particularly active-and unsuccessful-in this area. In 1938
the state court held, with the great weight of authority, that a proposed
bill which would have regulated the hours of opening and closing for
barber shops in any city or town would be unconstitutional, if enacted. 11
The state court said:
There are many barber shops in the Commonwealth run by the
proprietor without help. It might well be a great hardship for such
a barber not to conform to the needs of his customers as to the
hours of keeping his shop open ....
It might interfere to a great
extent with his business . . . to comply . . . . The hours of labor

may also be such as to render it unreasonable to require the barber
to adhere to the stated hours. It is difficult to see how the reasons
suggested in support of the bill, such as protection from tuberculosis and other communicable diseases, and the promotion of public morals, are compatible with § 2 of the proposed act allowing
cities and towns which accept the act to vary the 117
hours without
any limitation other than the total number of hours.
Some twenty years later another proposed bill was before the Massachusetts court, and it reaffirmed its prior ruling." 8 The 1958 version
contained an additional wrinkle. It allowed the board of registration
to approve "reasonable" agreements by 70% of the licensed barbers
115 "If the proper inquiry were -limited solely to the private economic interests
of the parties, the statute would appear to be unreasonable since it discriminates
against retail laboratories for the benefit of dentists and wholesale laboratories.
However, whereas in this area important questions of public health are involved,
the validity of a statute must be measured primarily by the reasonable necessity
of the regulation in safeguarding the public rather than the effect of the statute
upon private economic interest." Comment, Dentists, Dental Laboratories and
the Public Interest, 51 N.W. U.L. Rev. 123, 126 (1956).
116 Opinion of the Justices, 300 Mass. 615, 14 N.E.2d 953 (1938).
117 300 Mass. at 618-619. The Massachusetts court also adverted to a possible "Equal Protection Clause" infirmity in the proposed legislation. "The
proposed bill does not apply to hairdressers . . . nor . . . to beauty parlors. ...
It has been held, since the acts performed on customers of barber shops and
beauty shops are very similar in their nature, that such an omission renders unconstitutional a statute because of discrimination between persons belonging to
the same class." Id. at 617. But it is clear that the Supreme Court would not
find that the discrimination ran afoul of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See notes 24-33 and text supra.
118 Opinion of the Justices, 337 Mass. 796, 151 N.E.2d 631 (1958).
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in any city or town setting the days and hours that barber shops could
be kept open. The court viewed this provision as an added ground for
condemnation. "There is no discernible connection with public health
or safety in a provision which makes a trade agreement a condition
precedent to board action. The result could be economic tyranny."" 19
An attempt by the hairdressers to totally eliminate competitive activity
from one segment of the occupational group met with a similar fate. In
Mansfield Beauty Academy v. Board of Registration,12° the court,
noting the obvious economics behind the legislation, struck down a
statute which prohibited training schools for hairdressers from making
any charge for materials or services in connection with the practice of
hairdressing or manicuring performed by students.
Occupational groups have, however, successfully managed to expel
"corporate competition." McMurdo v. Getter,1 2 1 decided in 1937, involved a statute which prohibited the practice of optometry by a corporation, and apparently was aimed at the optometry departments of large
department stores. Mr. Justice Lummus' opinion began by demonstrating the power of the legislature to regulate the learned professions,
which may be held to higher ethical standards than ordinarily prevail
in the market place. Furthermore, it states that the weight of authority
supports the general rule banning corporate practice of the learned professions because:
..

.

[a] corporation . . .cannot possess the personal qualities re-

quired of a practitioner of a profession. Its servants, though professionally trained and duly licensed to practice, owe their primary
allegiance and obedience to their employer rather than to the clients
or patients of their employer. The rule stated recognizes the necessity of an immediate and unbroken relationship of a professional
man and those who engage his services. 122
The opinion conceded that the state courts were divided on the issue
of applying such criteria to optometry, but concluded that:
119

Id. at 799. It is interesting to note that the courts have shown a marked

sympathy towards legislative authorization of trade agreements in certain areas,
particularly agriculture. Cf. United States Rock Royal Co. Operative, 308 U.S.
553 (1939); Schwegmann Brothers Giant Super Mkts. v. McCrory, 237 La. 768,
112 So. 2d 606 (1959). See notes 6 and 7 supra.
120 326 Mass. 624, 96 N.E.2d 145 (1951).
The act, St. 1941, c. 626, § 3 also
prohibits any student from practicing on paying customers. This part of the
statute was not contested, 326 Mass. at 625. The statute was amended after the
decision, St. 1958, c. 85, § 1 et. seq., apparently to avoid the remainder of the
statute from being held invalid solely because of inseparability.
121 298 Mass. 363, 10 N.E.2d 139 (1937).
Accord. Kay Jewelry Co. v. Board
of Registration, 300 Mass. 581, 27 N.E.2d (1940). Many of the cases present
problems of classification. Rather than view the corporation cases as simply
banning entry into an occupation, I think they should be viewed as expulsion
of competition from already existing sources somewhat distinct from the self
conscious occupational group.
122 298 Mass. at 368.
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The considerations to the contrary seem to us more weighty.
In recent times abnormalities of the eye, like those of the teeth,
have been found sometimes to indicate and often to result in
serious impairment of the general health. .

.

. The learning and

the ethical standards required for that work, and the trust and
confidence reposed in optometrists by those who employ them,
cannot be dismissed as negligible or as not transcending the requirements of an ordinary trade. We cannot pronounce as arbitrary or
irrational the placing of optometry on a professional
123
basis.
Despite the carefully worked out reasoning of the opinion, it seems
that a stronger argument could have been based on a theory of denial
of equal protection of the laws. The essence of the holding is that the
legislature could reasonably conclude that the practice of optometry
now requires the undivided loyalty of the optometrist to the patient.
Yet another section of the act 124 allows the unregistered spouse of a
deceased or incapacitated optometrist to continue the business through
a licensed practitioner. One could argue with plausibility that while
the law often should, but does not distinguish between the corporation
and the widow, such a distinction here cannot be supported in terms
of the reasoning sustaining the restriction against corporate practice.
Had such an argument been pressed it might have prevailed on the
state constitutional level. But I think it is perfectly clear that the
Supreme Court of the United States would find no transgression of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 12 5
In light of the rationale of the Getter opinion, the subsequent decision
in Attorney General v.

Union Plumbing Co.1 26 seems questionable.

Once again the state court upheld expulsion of corporate competition.
The statute prohibited corporations from carrying on the plumbing
business, since in order to carry on the plumbing business a master's
license was needed and there was no provision for its issuance to a
corporation, or to an employee of the corporation on the corporation's
behalf. 1 27 Clearly the rationale of the Getter case affords no basis for
the exclusion of a corporation from this line of business, and the opinion
does not address itself to any discussion of the constitutional problems
involved.' 28 It assumed 129 that the constitutional issue had been fore123
124
125

Id. at 369.
Mass. G.L., c. 112, § 73.

See notes 20-33 supra. Note that, unlike spouses, corporations enjoy an
indefinite existence.
126 301 Mass. 86, 16 N.E.2d 89 (1938).
127 The statute still contains the ban on corporate practice. Mass. G.L., c. 142,
§ 4.
128 Corporations are, of course, within the protective ambit of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The cases are reviewed by Circuit Judge
Soper in NAACP v. Patty, 159 F. Supp. 503 (E.D. Va. 1958), vacated and
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closed by the decision in Commonwealth v. McCarthy,"1 0 but that case
concerned itself only with an individual conducting a plumbing business
without a master's license, and not at all the question of whether a
corporation could be barred from securing a license.' 3'
VI
An examination of the occupational licensing statutes may well be
concluded by contrasting them with the more traditional type of license
often required as a prerequisite to occupational entry. These latter
licenses may be characterized as "good character or public health"
licenses, and have existed for many years. 13 2 The license issues after
some official, almost invariably a municipal official, concludes that the
applicant is of "good moral character," or that the grant of a license will
not be contrary to the "public interest or welfare." 13 In the "good character-public health"'u 4 license, the central problem is to prevent the
delegate from abusing his power to license. The fear is basically not
one of group economic discrimination, 13 5 but of arbitrary action. Therefore, the problem now tends to be viewed, perhaps somewhat erroneously, as one of laying down standards to control the delegate's exer36
cise of discretion.1
remanded sub. nom.; Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1957). But there are
still many unsettled features as to the nature of the protection afforded, especially
in respect to civil rights. The Massachusetts court seems to assume that ordinarily
a corporation may not be barred from carrying on an otherwise permissible occupation. Cf. Opinion of Justices, 322 Mass. 755, 19 N.E.2d 883 (1948) ; discussed
supra notes 17-18 and text. The issue of excluding a corporation simply because
it is a corporation does not usually reach the courts, except in the "learned profession" cases.
129 301 Mass. at 89.
130 225 Mass. 192, 114 N.E. 287 (1916).
131 In view of the recent trend of decisions, one would not expect the Supreme
Court to intervene here.
132 The Massachusetts statute books are top heavy with licensing laws, but it
would serve no useful function to list them here. For an excellent early survey
of the chaotic state of these statutes, see Comment, The Delegation of Discretion
In Massachusetts Licensing Legislation, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 302 (1929).
183 E.g., Mass. G.L., c. 101, § 22 (hawkers and peddlers); c. 100, § 2
(auctioneers).
'34 E.g., Mass. G.L., c. 140, § 49
(lunch carts) ; c. 140, § 2 (innholders and
common victuallers). Cf. Liggett Drug Co. v. North Adams, 296 Mass. 41, 4
N.E.2d 628 (1936).
135 In the "good character" license it is generally held to be impermissible
for the delegate to consider economic questions. Picone v. Commissioner of
Licenses, 241 N.Y. 157, 149 N.E. 336 (1925). Cf. Commonwealth v. McCarthy,
225 Mass. 192, 114 N.E. 287 (1916).
130 "The matter of standards in statutes and ordinances dealing with licensing
of the common occupations has been in great confusion. These statutes long
antedate the modern demand for limits on official power. Characteristically they
contained no standard; their validity was taken for granted . . . . In certain occupations deviously linked to criminal or disreputable activity, the determination of
the applicant's fitness must rest on suspicion or on evidence not capable of formal
presentation. It is convenient in such areas to justify broad discretion by dubbing
the license a 'privilege.' Thus within a single jurisdiction can be found cases which

OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING
The characteristics of the occupational licensing system are of course
markedly dissimilar from those of the "good character-public welfare" license. Here a license issues from a state board composed of
members of a clearly defined, self-conscious occupational group. Ostensibly at least, competence is the criterion for issuance (hence the
elaborate determination of competence based upon education, experience
and examinations), whereas, as we have seen, the traditional license
does not concern itself with assuring a minimum level of competence.
Furthermore, the modern occupational licensing laws are not at all
defective for want of adequate standards; rather, the problem is to
prevent clearly spelled out standards from becoming tools for exclusionary practices.
The gradual expansion of occupational licensing with its built-in,
guild-like propensities results in the steady erosion of traditional freedoms, often without the usual offsetting compensations to the public welfare which are expected when freedom is curbed. Of course,
in a country beset by the problems of nuclear war and civil rights
legislation. I do not suggest that this is one of the major problems
of the day. The restrictions imposed by these statutes must be considerably more widespread and severe before there will be anything
approaching public concern over the matter. In the meantime, however, we see here, as in other areas, a slow, barely perceptible inroad
on a traditional freedom. It is in vain to look to the judges to act as
an effective check against such legislation. At best, the courts can do
little but slow down the process-to attempt more would be beyond the
judicial power in a democratic society. "For protection against abuses
by the legislatures the people must resort to the polls, not the
courts.'

l3 7

Thus the ultimate responsibility for the preservation of

freedom is in the people themselves. And as Brandeis aptly put it,
"The greatest menace to freedom is an inert people.' 38
In the final analysis, then, the primary responsibility for any extension of occupational licensing must rest with the people through their
elected representatives. Obviously, a good many licensing statutes are
uphold grants of licensing power without a stated standard on the ground that
there is no 'right' to engage in the occupation and others which denounce grants
of 'unlimited' power to license a 'lawful' business," Jaffe, Administrative Law,
Cases and Materials 52 (Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1953). The Massachusetts statutes
are analyzed in Comment, The Delegation of Discretion in Massachusetts Licensing Statutes, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 302 (1929). For the view that the problem of
controlling the delegate's exercise of discretion is not reducible to a quest for
standards see 1 Davis, Administrative Law, §§ 2.01-2.13 (West Publishing Co.,
1958).
137 Chief Justice Waite in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876), cited
with approval in Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955). Cf.
Tenney v. Brandenhowe, 341 U.S. 367, 368 (1951).
138 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927)
(concurring opinion).
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rammed through a busy legislature with very little awareness by anyone (except the sponsors) of what is going on. Ideally, however, we
expect the legislature to take stock of what is happening and to address
itself to the conflicting policy issues involved. The question the legislature should ask itself when called upon to consider the licensing of
an occupation is essentially a pragmatic one. Is the activity so directly
related to the public welfare that the existing laws (both criminal and
civil) are inadequate to protect the public interest ?1 9 This question
ought to be considered in the light of the high value which our democratic society has traditionally ascribed to an individual's freedom to
choose freely any of the common occupations of life.
In evaluating the necessity for an extension of licensing, the legislature may fairly consider whether optional certification rather than
compulsory licensing would be more appropriate in effectuating legislative ends.' 40 Compulsory licensing is a door closing device, whereas
optional certification merely prohibits the noncertificate holder from
holding himself out as having been officially adjudged as possessing a
certain level of competence. This solution works admirably in certain
areas at least. Consider, for example, that in most states certified public accountants and professional engineers are certificate holders, not
compulsory licensees.
In some instances, at least, we ask of the legislature only that it exercise a little common sense. After all, "we can struggle along with much
less licensing than we have-and certainly without the additional
licensing of caterers, canopy and awning installers, cider makers, coal
merchants, dancing masters, egg breakers, frog dealers, music teachers,
41
and beer coil cleaners who have recently sought to be regulated."'
139
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Report, op. cit., supra, note 35 at 147-148.
See Gellhorn, op. cit., supra, note 36 at 147-148.

Id. at 145.

